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APPENDIX C Alternative specification with shadow ratings specifying subordinate securities
The baseline model in the main text assumes that bidders' "shadow rating" specifies the subordination amount for the AAA security, based on the salience of this figure as an institutional feature of CMBS. In this appendix, we consider an alternative assumption under which the shadow rating stipulates subordination amounts for all of the securities, both AAA and non-AAA.
For tractability, we make an assumption that allows us to continue regarding bids as one-dimensional (as in the baseline case). Namely, we assume that the loss distribution on the pool principal is drawn from a stochastically ordered family of distributions (assumed to be common knowledge). A "bid" can be thought of as the bidder's assertion about the specific distribution of losses, with the stochasticordering assumption allowing bids to be ranked along a single dimension.
As in the baseline case, in order for the model to be identified, we must normalize the scaling of the bids to something observable. For this purpose, we define a measure of how favorably an entire deal is rated overall-the weighted-average "rating-implied yield spread" (WARIS). Let ⇣ r be the proportion of securities rated r. For a set of ratings 1 . . . R: W ARIS = P R r ⇣ r · RIS r , The constant RIS r proxies for the level of risk associated with rating r. Following Efing and Hau (2015) , we define RIS r to be the fixed e↵ect associated with rating r in a regression of observed bond yields at issuance on various deal-and security characteristics. 35 We take as given that a lower WARIS is more favorable to the issuer-conceptually, a lower WARIS implies a lower cost of funding due to lower yields that must be paid to investors.
Consider the problem of minimizing the WARIS over alternative choices of ⇣ r given some set of constraints on the permissible loss rate for each rating. The stochastic-ordering assumption implies that a bid can equivalently be thought of as stipulating the lowest feasible value of WARIS given such constraints. 36 The final deal structure is determined in the following manner. Recall that in the baseline case, the final AAA share is determined by the K'th lowest winning bid, for an auction with K winners. Analogously, here the issuer minimizes the WARIS with respect to {proportion of securities rated r} 1,...R , subject to the constraints stipulated by each of the K winning bidders. 35 The regression is (yield spread at issuance ir ) = ↵ 0 W i + 0 Z ir + RISt + " ir , where W i are observed deal characteristics, Z ir are observed characteristics of securities rated r, and the dependent variable is the yield premium on securities from deal i that have rating r at the time of issuance. Data on security yields are from Commercial Mortgage Alert. 36 For example, according to the agencies' published investor guidelines, "AAA", "A1" and "B1" have idealized loss rates over four years of 0.001 percent, 0.104 percent, and 7.6175 percent, respectively. See "Probability of Default Ratings and Loss Given Default Assessments for Non-Financial Speculative-Grade Corporate Obligors in the United States and Canada," Moody's Investors Service (August 2006), Appendix 1 (available online).
We can specify bounds on the bidders' actual bids, based on the observed ratings of the winning bidders. Let W ARIS ⇤ ij denote the WARIS on deal i computed using bidder j's observed ratings. 37 For convenience, we transform W ARIS ⇤ ij by a known, monotone-decreasing, normalizing function q(·), in order to have a higher bid correspond to a more favorable outcome for the issuer (as in the baseline model). 38
• Suppose, there is a single observed winner and, without loss of generality, let this be bidder 1. By the definition of a bid, b i1 q(W ARIS ⇤ i1 ). Moreover, by the optimality of the issuer's behavior, this inequality must hold strictly:
). Otherwise, the issuer could structure the deal in a way that achieves a lower WARIS while still complying with bidder 1's requirements.
• Suppose there are two observed winners and, without loss of generality, let these be bidders 1 and 2. By the definition of a bid, b i1 q(W ARIS ⇤ i1 ) and b i2 q(W ARIS ⇤ i2 ). Moreover, the optimality of the issuer's behavior implies that one of these inequalities must hold strictly: otherwise the issuer could structure the deal in a way that achieves a lower WARIS while still complying with both bidders' requirements. Also, bidder 3 not being a winner implies b i3  min{b i1 , b i2 }.
• When all three agencies win, it must be the case that
Almost surely, exactly one of these inequalities must also hold strictly.
We perform the first-step estimation by maximizing a likelihood function that is similar to expression (9), but conditioning on the observed values of W ARIS ⇤ ij and the above inequalities, instead of the share of AAA.
The structural estimation is similar to the baseline case. First, for each auction i and each winning bidder j, we use bidder j's optimality condition to solve for the belief that would rationalize bidder i's bidding b ⇤ ij , which we denote by
. As in the baseline specification, we then compute moment conditions based on the expectation of the pivotal bidder's belief,û ⇤ i , similar to Equation (10). 37 Note that, in general, W ARIS ⇤ ij 6 = W ARIS ⇤ ij 0 for two bidders j and j 0 . This is the case due to the existence of "split ratings"-where the observed rating di↵ers across rating agencies-for securities other than the AAA one. 38 We define q(·) it to be an a ne transformation such that q(W ARIS ⇤ ij ) has the same mean and standard deviation across deals i and bidders j as the observed AAA share b ⇤ i .
APPENDIX D Estimates for Additional Specifications
Tables D.1 and D.2 report the first-step estimates corresponding to the "Alternative Specification" reported in Table 3 ). Tables D.3 and D.4 report the first-step estimates corresponding to the robustness check involving bids that specify the structure of both AAA and non-AAA securities, reported in Table 5 . Tables D.5 and D.6 report the post-estimation regressions of ex post deal outcomes on the ordinal distortion measure implied by the robustness checks in Sections VII.A and VII.B, respectively. Tables D.7, D.8, and D.9 report the first-step and structural estimates for another specification in which we endogenize the number of winning bidders. To accomplish this, we modify the issuer's maximization (Equation 1) as follows 39 :
The objective function from Equation 1 is in the first parenthesis. The term in the second parenthesis is new. This equation implies the issuer maximizes the pivotal bid times a function of how many ratings the issuer obtains. This modified specification captures the following tradeo↵ faced by the issuer. On the one hand, choosing fewer winners increases the AAA proportion, which equals the K'th highest bid when the issuer chooses K winners. On the other hand, investors may place a premium on deals with more ratings-either because they value corroborating opinions or because they are sophisticated and recognize issuers' incentive to ratings shop. We do not explicitly model investor demand, but rather, specify that the issuer's payo↵ depends in an exogenous way on the number of bids, with  2 representing the premium for having two ratings versus only one, and  3 representing the premium for having three ratings versus two. In principle, the issuer's premia on having at least two ratings ( 2 ) or three ratings ( 3 ) are identified by the relative frequency of auctions for which there are one, two, or three winners, and can be estimated jointly with the remaining first-step parameters. However, because the z ij 's for losing bidders are known only in distribution, we have only weak identification of  2 and  3 separately from the degree of correlation in the bids (determined by the first-step parameters ⌦ and { } j=1,2,3 ). 40 Intuitively, both greater correlation in the bids (which compresses the various order statistics of the bid profile) and a greater issuer premium on having more ratings would tend to result in more winners being selected. To finesse this issue, we do not attempt to estimate  2 and  3 . Rather, we fix their values at a level that is higher than seems reasonable (5 percent and 2.5 percent respectively)-which maximally alters the likelihood function for the remaining parameters, relative to the base specification in which the number of winners is exogenous. Therefore, if the number of winners were truly endogenous, the di↵erence between these estimates and the base specification estimates would "bound" the impact of erroneously assuming an exogenous number of winners. In fact, we do not find any qualitative di↵erences between the estimates that endogenize the number of winners and the base specification. Tables D.1 and D.2 report maximum likelihood estimates for the first-step parameters of the "Alternative Specification" (whose structural parameter estimates are in Table 3 ). All of the first-step parameters are jointly estimated but are reported in two separate tables due to space considerations. Tables D.1 and D.2 report maximum likelihood estimates for the first-step parameters of the "Alternative Specification" (whose structural parameter estimates are in Table 3 ). All of the first-step parameters are jointly estimated but are reported in two separate tables due to space considerations. Table D .2 shows the estimated equilibrium bidding behavior. The sieve parameters capture the e↵ect of covariates on bidding behavior for individual agencies. The covariance parameters capture the joint distribution of the component of agencies' bids that is not explained by covariates. Note: Tables D.3 and D.4 report maximum likelihood estimates for the first-step parameters of the robustness check with bids specifying structure of both AAA and non-AAA securities: distribution of presale-report variables (whose structural parameter estimates are in Table 5 ). All of the first-step parameters are jointly estimated but are reported in two separate tables due to space considerations. Table D .3 shows the estimated joint distribution of the weighted-average reunderwritten DSCR and LTV for each agency (at the deal-level), assuming joint normality. Tables D.3 and D.4 report maximum likelihood estimates for the first-step parameters of the robustness check with bids specifying structure of both AAA and non-AAA securities: distribution of presale-report variables (whose structural parameter estimates are in Table 5 ). All of the first-step parameters are jointly estimated but are reported in two separate tables due to space considerations. Table D .4 shows the estimated joint distribution of the weighted-average reunderwritten DSCR and LTV for each agency (at the deal-level), assuming joint normality. Table D .5-Tobit regressions for ex post deal outcomes (principal losses and interest shortfall) on distortion ( i ) and control variables, for robustness check involving alternative bidder preferences (i.e., the uniform-"price" specification) Note: Dependent variable is sum of principal loss and interest payment shortfalls on the deal's loan pool, as of the censoring date (September 2012), expressed as a share of the original pool principal. Letting denote linear coe cients and " a normal error, the assumed model is: Note: Dependent variable is sum of principal loss and interest payment shortfalls on the deal's loan pool, as of the censoring date (September 2012), expressed as a share of the original pool principal. Letting denote linear coe cients and " a normal error, the assumed model is:
dependent variable = 0 (covariates) + " if 0 (covariates) + " > 0, = 0 otherwise. Tables D.7 and D.8 report maximum likelihood estimates for the first-step parameters of the specification endogenizing the number of winning bidders (discussed earlier in this Appendix), fixing  2 = 0.05 and  3 = 0.025. (Structural estimates are reported in Table D .9). All of the first-step parameters are jointly estimated but are reported in two separate tables due to space considerations. Table D .7 shows the estimated joint distribution of the weighted-average reunderwritten DSCR and LTV for each agency (at the deal-level), assuming joint normality. 
APPENDIX E Solving for Counterfactual Equilibrium of Bidding Game

Existence of Pure Strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
In this Appendix, we argue that a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) exists for the bidding game described in the model. If the possible set of actions were discrete (e.g., if bidders could bid only in increments of 0.01), the existence of a PSNE would be guaranteed so long as the game satisfies the Single-Crossing Condition (SCC) and certain other regularity conditions (see Definition 3 and Theorem 1 in Athey, 2001) . The SCC can easily be shown to hold in our setup, and stipulates that, for each player j = 1, . . . , J, whenever every opponent j 0 6 = j uses a strategy that is nondecreasing in its type, player j's objective function satisfies the single crossing property of incremental returns in (b ij , t ij ). Because the objective function ⇡ ij (t ij , b i ) is di↵erentiable, it su ces to observe that @⇡ ij (t ij ,b i ) @t ij @b ij > 0. In the case of continuous actions, existence of a PSNE could be shown constructively by taking the limit of the finite-action equilibrium for successively finer action sets if the limit of this series were guaranteed to be an equilibrium of the continuous game. A complication arises in bidding games, such as in our setup, because the outcome (namely, the set of winners) is discontinuous in the actions. However, this problem goes away if, in the limit as the action becomes successively finer, "mass points" do not arise and the payo↵s are continuous. The conditions for this to hold are discussed in Theorem 6 of Athey (2001), and are either standard or hold trivially in the current setting by virtue of the assumption of private values.
Solution method
The solution method falls under the general approach of mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). Let ' ij (b ij ) =b ij denote the inverse bid function for bidder j in auction i (we assume a bidder's bid function is monotone and thus invertible). Following Hubbard and Paarsch (2009) and Bajari (2001), we approximate j's inverse bid function ' ij (b ij ) by 0 ij f (b ij ), where f (·) is a family of basis functions (which we choose to be Chebyshev polynomials). Solving for the PSNE entails finding coe cients { ij } for bidders j = 1, . . . J that best fit a set of equilibrium conditions, evaluated on a set of grid points over the domain of possible bids. For all grid points b and b 0 , the imposed equilibrium conditions are as follows:
• Optimality: setting b ij = b andb ij = 0 ij f (b) satisfies bidder j's first-order condition (4).
